

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
		18 SEPT 1985
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. EXO/DDA		18.9
2. ADDA		18 SEP 1985
3. DDA		18.9
4.		
5. DDA REGISTRY		
Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

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REMARKS

D/OLL HAS ACTION.

cc: D/OS

done 9/18/85

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The DDA was not on the distribution list for the Durenberger/Roth letters.

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

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FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

16 Sept 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO #85-3037

September 11, 1985

85-~~██████~~
2457/2

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

DDA REGISTRY
FILE: 100-13


Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter concerning the adverse impact that H.R. 2401, the Field Office Closing Justification Act, would have on intelligence activities.

This legislation has been referred to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and we have been assured that the Bill will be amended to reflect your concerns. I would suggest that you have your staff contact Roger Sperry (224-4751) of the Governmental Affairs Committee staff, who is handling this matter.

Please do not hesitate to contact us again if you need any additional assistance.

Sincerely,



Dave Durenberger
Chairman

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

85-2457/1 ER

100-13

OIL 85-2256

The Honorable Dave Durenberger
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Recently the House passed H.R. 2401, the Field Office Closing Justification Act. If enacted into law, this legislation would defer the closure or reorganization of any field office of any agency and any personnel actions incident thereto for 120 days. In addition, the agency proposing such action would be required to file a comprehensive report and impact analysis on the closure or reorganization to the Congress.

We wish to register our strong opposition to H.R. 2401, and to seek your assistance in obtaining relief for the Intelligence Community from the bill's application. For a number of reasons, the bill is incompatible with intelligence activities and would be harmful to the national security.

Of particular concern to the Community are the reporting requirements mandated by the bill. The required report to Congress must identify the office or offices involved, and the nature and the reasons for the proposed closure or reorganization. Furthermore, this report must compare the number of employees who are assigned to the office before and the number assigned immediately after the proposed action. An accounting for any difference in these numbers incident to the closure or reorganization, including a summary of personnel actions, also must be included.

In addition, a comparison must be made of the functions performed by the office before and after the implementation of the proposed action. The report must provide an assessment of the relative capability of the office to perform its assigned functions before and after its proposed reorganization. The agency must assess and report on the economic impact and other consequences of the reorganization on the community in which the office is located. Finally, there must be a statement of the cost, benefits and other effects expected to flow from the reorganization or closure.

This report must be submitted to Congress when it is in session. In practice then, the delay in closure or reorganization may be much longer than 120 days. Given the size of many CIA field offices, the transfer of two persons could trigger these reporting requirements. These reporting requirements are particularly troubling given the expressed purpose of the bill to bring this "entire process out into the open."

Application of this legislation to the CIA would be harmful to the national security. By its very nature, successful intelligence gathering and counterintelligence operations must be flexible and secure. Reorganizations, closures, and changes in function are contingent in many cases upon unique opportunities or unforeseen requirements. In many instances, the Agency takes a project approach for the accomplishment of an objective fully intending to close the office on completion of the project. Moreover, it is not uncommon for the Agency to have a one person field operation. Such reporting and the attendant statutory delay period are particularly troublesome with respect to cover operations where a function may have to be closed down overnight if its presence is disclosed. The impairment of intelligence activities that would result from this bill is unnecessary since there is no major reorganization or closure at the Agency of which the Intelligence Committees are not informed.

Preparation of these reports would be a substantial diversion of intelligence resources. In an increasingly complex and dangerous world, the Agency needs greater flexibility not rigidity in the allocation of human resources. Intelligence activities are extremely time sensitive and the delays required by H.R. 2401 are simply intolerable.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we are strongly opposed to the enactment of H.R. 2401. Members of my legislative liaison staff are available to work with the Committee on this important matter.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no objection from the standpoint of the Administration's program to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

Distribution:

Original - Addressees

Senator Durenberger

Senator Roth

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - EXDIR

~~1~~ - ER

1 - D/OLL

1 - DD/OLL

1 - OLL Chrono

1 - Leg/Sub - Misc. Pers.

1 - Signer

LEG/OLL: (16 August 1985)

STAT

85-2457/1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington D.C. 20505

OLL 85-2257

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

W. J. Casey

William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence